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Abstract 
Organisations rely on business processes to define their day-to-day commercial activities. 
Any disruption of these business processes will have a direct impact on the organisation’s 
ability to perform its functions.  In this paper we review the DEViSE Workbench, 
developed for network security visualisation, and demonstrate how business processes can 
be augmented with network security audit information to provide a precise understanding 
of how attacks impact the higher-level business roles. The paper outlines a prototype tool 
called BPEvents that can be used to highlight the severity of computer network attacks 
(CNA) in terms of the impact on business functions using the standard XPDL notation. 
Introduction 
Visualisation has become more important in the field of information security in recent 
years; techniques demonstrating interactive discovery and presentation [16] of problems 
and dedicated conferences such as VizSec [17] remain important resources whether 
analysing static data files [13] or process propagation [14]. As demonstrated by Fischer, 
Monsmann, Kein, Pietzko & Waldvogel [15] the ability to visualise both complex 
network connections and the information transmitted across a network can support the 
management of the network during a sustained cyber attack. There have been a number 
of highly publicized targeted attacks on Sony, PayPal, Visa, Mastercard and other 
private firms by so called “hacktivists” such as Anonymous and LulzSec [5]. Whilst 
these types of attacks are certainly not lacking in severity, they are still stereotypical of 
the “opportunistic” hacking style, i.e. perform reconnaissance of the target network and 
focus all effort on an insecure / vulnerable system. Such attacks have risen to 
prominence at the government level. In the UK for example, network security has 
featured quite prominently in a recent strategic defence and security review [1]. This 
document particularly emphasises the severity of attacks on networks (“...one of the 
four Tier One risks to national security...” [1]) and “...demonstrates the need for a 
flexible cyber security response” [1]. 
We have traditionally considered network attacks in very technical terms, i.e. as 
affecting computer servers (physical or virtual) on the network. There is a need for tools 
to start considering such events in terms of what is important to the business, i.e. in 
terms of business functions. One factor causing concern is the degree to which 
commercial, government and military organisations now rely upon digital systems to 
perform tasks that support their day-to-day operations or business functions [6].  
Commercial organisations are not only increasingly finding it difficult to address 
the increasing variety of network attacks but also to understand the degree to which they 
can impact their core business processes [7]. When attacks start to have an effect on the 
production line, organisations take notice “...and integrate information protection 
practices into business processes” [7]. 
Military organisations echo similar problems. An attack on the UK Ministry of 
Defence supply chain, reportedly at “critical risk of failure” [18], could see overseas 
efforts severely disrupted. The network defence systems of the Norwegian Military, 
This paper was presented at the NIK 200x conference. For more information see http://www.nik.no/ 
 
received in response to Norway’s involvement in the NATO led force in Libya [8], were 
described as being “...attacked daily, but it's not often we see such a comprehensive 
attempt at infiltration as this was. The trend is increasing, though, and the attackers are 
more goal-oriented” [8]. 
The term “goal-oriented” certainly indicates something more targeted than the 
opportunistic “hacktivist” approach. Goals for disrupting military may be to affect the 
delivery of aircraft fuel, resulting in a loss of aerial military capability. For industry, 
perhaps altering an order of components leading to an underproduction of products and 
competitors increasing their market share. As thoroughly critiqued by Goel & Chen [9] 
“... it is imperative to use cognitive aids while analyzing security risks.”  
What any organisation, whether commercial, government or military, wants is to 
remain in continual operation such that its own business goals can be realised. If (or 
more accurately when) attacks occur, the business will ideally seek resilient methods of 
operation such that it can continue to function.  
The rest of this paper is arranged as follows. Contribution discusses the focus of the 
paper, literature review provides an overview of business processes and their relation to 
security visualisation, business process visualisation describes how business processes 
are being visualised, core functionality of BPEvents highlights the main areas of the 
prototype application relevant to business process and cyber security, case study 
demonstrates usage of BPEvents within the DEViSE framework, integration with the 
DEViSE framework highlights how BPEvents data can be used with other visualisation 
tools and conclusions discusses what has been learnt in pairing the business process and 
cyber security fields. 
 
Contribution 
An issue when addressing the impact of a computer network attack on an organisation is 
to try and link the high-level conceptual business process activities and the low-level 
tangible technical computing systems together. Although the process activities still tend 
to be initiated, created and updated by people, more of these functions now occur on 
electronic systems of some description (desktop computer, tablet, smartphone, etc). 
Mapping each business process activity directly onto its corresponding digital 
device, when some malicious activity takes place it is then possible to look at the 
consequences and disruption to business activities.  
The prototype tool presented in this paper will visualise the impact of a selected 
event observed at the technical level, onto the business process tier, noting not only 
which activities are directly affected but also how subsequent activities are also under 
threat. Therefore this should address the following points: how business processes are 
vulnerable to cyber attack, is it possible to identify critical systems, understanding the 
implications in terms of lost capability and understanding the knock-on effect to 
additional business activities. 
 
Literature Review 
There are a number of difficulties an organisation can face as a result of a network 
intrusion. In terms of business process, availability and integrity are usually considered 
to be more important that confidentiality. The process has to be available and operating 
for the business process to function. Work presented by Goudalo & Seret [10] 
demonstrate how the engineering of security information systems can be formalised into 
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business processes by going through a step-by-step approach with UML modelling. The 
authors used UML2 activity diagrams so those needing to implement other methods 
such as the business process model and notation (BPMN) [20] would only need a 
translation layer for converting between standards. 
For organisations with rapidly changing business processes, particularly those that 
have grown ‘organically’ over a longer period of time, the way in which the physical 
network supports business functions may not be immediately apparent until problems 
arise. This could lead to operational delays when handling an incident; if the IT 
infrastructure is not well defined in terms of how it supports the specific functions of the 
business, mitigation strategies cannot be immediately deployed. 
Previous work has examined how security goals may be expressed at the business 
process level. The work by Wolter, Menzel, Schaad, Miseldine & Meinel [11] looks at 
annotating business processes with high-level security goals and then how they may be 
transformed into real access control and security policies, which may be deployed on a 
network. However, addressing the impact of attacks on a business process is outside the 
scope of their work.  Wolter et al. [11] do mention that business process experts need to 
collaborate with security experts in such a way that new augmented views of the 
business processes are demonstrated to decision-makers such that mission-critical 
functions can be dealt with in a prioritised fashion.  
Similar work has been presented by D’Amico & Salas [12] whereby mission 
critical tasks are mapped out in different views. Operational missions are tied into the 
mission critical tasks, which can then be attached to different types of assets. These 
different views allow for the mapping of assets to alerts and vulnerabilities which 
provide situational awareness to the user. The mission critical example presented by 
D’Amico & Salas [12] is of particular note and would complement the approach taken 
in this paper. 
On the technical side of security visualisation, cyber security protection mechanisms 
such as anti-virus, intrusion detection systems and firewalls produce logs which 
typically retain metadata of events they have observed. Such audit data can grow rapidly 
on busy corporate networks and can be difficult to read individually given the quantity 
of information. Colour can be added to log files to help make certain events stand out to 
the analyst (Fig. 1.). 
 
 
Figure 1: Colours representing severity, logs truncated for brevity 
The specialist field of security visualisation has developed considerably further than 
the use of colour coded log files. There are several dedicated books on the subject and a 
number of different visualisation techniques have emerged over the years [3-4]. 
Fig. 2 shows security tools demonstrating geographical, temporal and logical data 
types. Visualisation tools are typically categorised as either monitoring, analytical, or 
informational. Monitoring tools are designed to continually refresh and show new 
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patterns as they occur, analytical tools encourage correlation and data fusion whilst 
informational tools describe very few, if not a single, attack in verbose detail [15].   
 
 
Figure 2: Different security visualisation paradigms 
These different classifications may appear in the same security visualisation 
application. Tools such as TNV and Sawmill provide different views in the one 
application allowing a user to visually data-mine through logs of events. The difficulty 
with this approach is that the applications do not readily exchange information for 
further visualising; interesting patterns in one application cannot readily be passed into 
another tool. 
Architectures such as the DEViSE framework by Read, Xynos & Blyth [2] offer 
greater interactivity between security visualisations. By incorporating to the principles 
of the UNIX Philosophy [19] individual applications exhibit specific visualisation types 
(scatter graphs, bar charts, geographic maps, etc). Hotspots [2] highlight collections of 
data in a visualisation which can be manipulated and passed as input to other 
visualisations to allow rapid analysis and understanding of network events. 
Overall, looking at the areas of business processes and cyber security demonstrate a 
need for providing different visualisations for different users and being mindful of their 
respective needs. For example, a network defender needs to understand to what degree 
their network has been compromised and would benefit from a suite of tools to enable 
comprehension of IP / MAC addresses, user names and other technical details identified 
by security hardware and software. Managers, on the other hand, have a different, but 
complementary role, needing the ability to understand the impact of the attacks on 
business functions, and then making decisions as to how the organisation can best 
respond, adapt and continue to operate.  
 
Business Process Visualisation 
Businesses and organisations have a certain way of operating. This operation can be 
captured and streamlined through the modeling of business logic. 
When modelling business logic, a domain expert will document the activities in an 
abstract model such as a business process. A number of detailed levels will be 
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considered which can help depict an organisation’s operations with the use of models or 
through visual cues. Domain experts also rely highly on IT experts within the 
organisation to bridge the gap between models and actual implementations, current and 
projected. 
Fundamentally, a business process is an activity diagram showing how a business 
function is executed from initiation to conclusion. The capture of such information is 
quite a manual and time consuming task and will be more complex in large 
organisations. A number of business process modeling languages exist to help with the 
task of capture, processing and distribution of such information. The current standard is 
the Business Process Model and Notation (BPMN) system [20], maintained by the 
OMG consortium. BPMN can be expressed in a visual manner in the form of a Business 
Process Diagram (BPD). 
As can be seen in Fig. 3, a number of standard elements are used; flows, connectors 
and artifacts all come together to describe a business process. In this particular example, 
the diagram represents the procurement process for obtaining new goods / services. It 
should be emphasised that BPMN supports process management to technical and non-
technical users. However, BPMN is not a way of storing or transmitting such 
information electronically. Serialisation of BPMN comes in the form of the “XML 
Process Definition Language” (XPDL) [21]. 
 
 
Figure 3: A procurement business process diagram (BPD)  
Core Functionality of BPEvents 
The tool presented in this paper is an interactive application with two methods of use; a 
high-level overview of CNA impact on a business process and a deep-dive detailed 
mode allowing an analyst the opportunity to further their investigations. The 
functionality of this tool, named BPEvents, is outlined in Figures 4 and 5. 
At its core, BPEvents imports standard XPDL files which are then parsed and 
visualised, creating a blueprint of the business process. An associated network data file 
is imported and the two are cross-referenced to identify IP addresses in use by the 
business process. 
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Figure 4: An overview of BPEvents 
The main components of the tool in the overview mode (Fig. 4) are as follows. 1. 
The overall, at-a-glance view permits an analyst to see what areas of the overall 
business process are affected by the attack. 2. Colour is used to denote the seriousness 
of the attack as defined by the intrusion detection system feed. 3. White is the default 
color, indicating these activities/systems are unaffected by the visualised network attack 
and can continue as normal. 4. The pane has a running feed from the intrusion detection 
sensors, providing further deep-dive capabilities for an analyst. 5. Selecting an attack 
(highlighted in grey) locks the event on the overview pane (1.) disabling the live 
updates, allowing an analyst further opportunity to examine the impact of the attack. 
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Figure 5: BPEvents - "deep-dive" view 
The main components of BPEvents in the deep-dive view (Fig. 5) are as follows. 1. 
The system or systems that are the recipient of the attack (one computing device may be 
responsible for several activities) are emboldened, effectively visualising the activity 
originally affected by the attack. 2. Further business activities that are affected are 
coloured the same as the attacked system (1.) but are not emboldened. This 
demonstrates that, although the attack did not directly harm the underlying computing 
device in this activity, it is affected by proximity in the business process workflow. 3. 
Event counters will increment alongside each activity as attacks occur.  
 
Case Study: Determining the Greater Impact 
Security visualisation assists the analyst by taking log files, alerts and other data sources 
and correlating them into fewer sources to provide, overall, aggregated information. 
Unfortunately, one of the shortfalls of this traditional approach is that analysts are 
disconnected from the business processes that would be affected as a consequence of 
the attacks they are analysing. 
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Figure 6: Two SQL injection attacks with different IP addresses 
Consider the two almost indistinct log entries in Fig. 6. A SQL injection attack has 
taken place on two web servers with IP addresses 5.5.5.1 and 5.5.5.2. Apart from the IP, 
the attack is identical, and the intrusion detection system has logged it as a critical 
priority 1. We need to determine which is more critical and requires immediate 
attention. 
 
 
Figure 7: Attack impact on a business process model - attack 1 
The impact of this SQL injection attempt cannot be displayed with conventional 
network analysis visualisations; the two attacks are just too similar. If the business 
process tier is added to the decision making process, tying the business activities and IT 
infrastructure together, a different result is seen. 
 By examining the differences between the two attacks on BPEvents, the resultant 
visuals, depicted in Figures 7 and 8, help identify, in terms of this particular business 
process, which attack has the greater impact. It appears the second attack, shown in Fig. 
2011-07-21 12:56:43 SQL generic sql update injection attempt: 
[Classification: Web Application Attack] [Priority: 1]: {TCP} 
dst=5.5.5.1 
2011-07-21 12:56:34 SQL generic sql update injection attempt: 
[Classification: Web Application Attack] [Priority: 1]: {TCP} 
dst=5.5.5.2 
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8, affects a greater percentage of the business process, and, therefore, should be 
addressed first. By visualising CNA data in this fashion, an organisation is better 
equipped for business continuity. 
 
Figure 8: Attack impact on a business process model - attack 2 
Integration with the DEViSE Framework 
By integrating BPEvents within the existing DEViSE framework, other visualisation 
tools can be used recursively to explore the data. Analysts can use the information 
presented from this business process level and further visualise the CNA events in other 
tools at a logical / network level. Interacting with the hotspots in this tool [2] will 
provide a list of compatible applications which can receive data directly from BPEvents. 
The analyst’s use of visualisation tools is tracked by the system using the ‘History 
Manager’ [2], which enables the operator to trace back through their analysis to review 
the investigation. The analyst’s view may look similar to Fig. 9, multiple visualisation 
tools, each pictorially different but all working and interacting with the same data 
source.  
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Figure 9: The DEViSE analyst's workbench 
 
Conclusions 
This paper has highlighted a prototype suite of tools, which bridge the gap between the 
technical complexities and impact of events against an organisation’s modeled business 
processes. Future work will investigate the ability to automatically enumerate a network 
to capture information on the systems present, as well as the way in which the business 
processes are supported by the underlying IT infrastructure. This would enable those 
organisations that have rapidly changing infrastructure to observe the changes in their 
business processes, in addition to any attempted attacks or successful intrusions on their 
systems. 
Automatic response to support the restoration of business processes is another area 
worth examining in the future. It may be that an organisation has multiple physical sites 
and redundant/backup infrastructure, which could be better utilised. This future system 
could present the user with options to move vital business process activities between 
systems if parts of the underlying IT infrastructure have been compromised.  
    Overall, the use of the BPMN standard has been incorporated with technical network 
data demonstrating the mapping between the logical and the managerial layers in an 
organisation. By visualising technical computer network attack data across business 
processes, it has been successfully shown that further information can be obtained from 
CNA impact, leading to greater understanding, situational awareness and more 
appropriate mitigation. 
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